(1) some obligations become operative upon the entry into force of the Declaration (one month after the signature). These concern:
(i Although Art.VH(l) states thai tbe parties 'win negotiate' an agreement, the wonting of pans. 2-4 of the tame Article as well as Vin and DC make it clear that we are here faced with a duty proper to enter into an agreement. This is farther nwticfltrd by the fact >fa*t the basic points of the content of the agreement are dearly set out.
(iii) a duty to negotiate with a view to settling possible disputes about the interpretation or application of the Declaration.
It is important to note that the Declaration includes a host of pacta de contrahendo and also pacta de negotiando. 5 Although the text of the Declaration features some hasty drafting, the contention can be made that it is by no means a mere set of political commitments. No one could entertain any doubt about the first class of undertakings mentioned above; but the same holds true for the other two classes as well Indeed, these two categories of international obligations are indicative both of the intent of the contracting parties -long at loggerheads with each other -to gradually come to a final settlement, and of the host of political, military, economic and social hurdles that stand in the way of this settlement 6 What distinguishes the two classes of obligations? In the case of pacta de contrahendo the contracting parties (1) clearly lay down an obligation to conclude an agreement, and in addition (2) outline the basic content of the future agreement. These pacta do not impose obligations si voluero that are subject to tbe persisting will of all contracting parties to enter into the future agreement. They go much further than that: they make it incumbent upon the parties to agree upon a specific legal regulation of the matter outlined in generic terms in the pactum. Since the parties must act in good faith, it follows that if one of them refuses to make the agreement or finds pretexts for delaying its conclusion, it is in breach of international law. Consequently, the other party can use all tbe legal means made available by the law of international responsibility for tbe purpose of demanding tbe implementation of the pactum.
5
On As was rightly pointed out by Beyeriin, ibid, at 374, 'Pactum de contrahendo and pactum de negotiando are of growing political importance in those areas where States on unfriendly or even hostile terms with each other, or belonging to antagonistic bloc systems, are willing to relieve tensions by entering into certain contractual relations with each other, however rudimentary such relations may be. In such a situation States will do everything possible to avoid any premature substantive agreement and, therefore, win only start with an understanding on certain common rules of procedure, eventually combined with some mutually agreed bask principles regarding the substance of a treaty to be concluded later. A pactum shaped in mis way operates as a procedural instrument for reaching, as a starting point, a minimal consensus between the parties concerned'.
So much for pacta de contrahendo. Do pacta de negotiando also impose any binding obligation? The answer is in the affirmative, although here the content of the obligation is more tenuous: the Parties are simply duty bound to enter into negotiations. However, both Parties are not allowed to (1) advance excuses for not engaging into or pursuing negotiations or (2) to accomplish acts which would defeat the object and the purpose of the future treaty. On this point international case-law is very clear and always demands full observance of good faith. To mention just one case, in the arbitral award of 24 March 1982 in Aminoil, it is apparent that, when embarking upon negotiations, the Parties are bound to comply with the 'general principles that ought to be observed in carrying out an obligation to negotiate', namely 'good faith as properly to be understood; sustained upkeep of the negotiations' over a period appropriate to the circumstances; awareness of the interests of the other party; and a persevering quest for an acceptable compromise'.
7 It should be added that emphasis on good faith is also laid down by the international legal literature. connection with para. 11 of Annex I absolutely obligates either side to reach an agreement, it is of the opinion that the terms of these provisions require ate parties to negotiate, bargain, and in good faith attempt to reach a result acceptable to both parties and thus bring an end to this long drawn controversy. The desirability of such a positive result is necessarily much greater in relationships between States than between individuals if for no other reason that die stakes are infinitely higher. When States have solemnly undertaken to resolve their differences and then fail to do so, incalculable harm can follow. The need for the peaceful solution of differences between States is so great and so essential to the well-being of the community of nations that, when disputants have reached a point of signifying their agreement to negotiate an outstanding dispute, the subsequent negotiations normally ought to lead to a satisfactory and equitable result' at 453.
See, e.g.. E Kron supra note 5, at 131; Beyerlin, supra note 5, at 427; Marion supra note 5, at 385-386. Fois supra note 5, at 124. At 120-126 this author rightly stresses, in addition, that the parties to npaaumde negotiando must refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty.
Antonio Cassesc
In short, even as regards the various obligations de negotiando mentioned above, the Declaration cannot be considered as an agreement whose implementation exclusively depends on the continuing political will of the Parties to peacefully settle their disagreements through negotiations.
Having said so, one should however add that it would be wrong to be blind to an important fact, remarkably, the Declaration in providing for the entering into of negotiations, does not take Die consequential and obvious step of setting up international mechanisms for inducing a recalcitrant Party to negotiate, or to endeavour to reach agreement 9 Much is therefore left to the goodwill of the two Parties concerned. To put it differently, the legal and institutional settlement of the various questions is to a large extent made contingent upon the future political attitude of the Parties and their continuing desire to come to terms and strike substantive deals on this intricate web of problems. Notably, Art. XV(1) provides thai any dispute arising oat of the application or interpretation of the Declaration or the subsequent agreements 'thai] be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee' provided for in Art X, while Art. XV(2) nipulatet that disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations 'may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties' (emphasis added).
HL The Agreement and Self-determination
The Isracl-PLO Agreement and Self-Determination 'Civil Administration will be dissolved' and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn' from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Article VII (5)); it is therefore clear that in this lapse of time, that should not exceed five years as from 13 April 1994, Palestinians will exercise full self-government. What about external self-determination! The Declaration is silent on this point, in particular on whether it is envisaged that the Palestinians will attain independent statehood, or some form of association with one of the existing States (e.g., Jordan or even Israel), or both. However, various provisions stipulate that the primary goal of the Declaration is to lead to the attainment of a 'permanent status' for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and that this 'permanent status' should be consonant with the aforementioned Security Council resolutions. It is well known that those resolutions, and particularly the first, which is more sweeping, hinge upon the following fundamental objectives: CO the 'establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East'; (ii) the 'withdrawal of Israel armed forces' from occupied territories as a consequence of the 'inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war'; (iii) 'respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area'. Civ) 'a just settlement of the refugee problem'. The attainment of all these objectives logically presupposes not only the establishment of an autonomous Palestinian authority in the occupied territories, but also the acquisition, by this authority and the territories which it shall control, of some sort of independent international status. Hence, it can be safely asserted that, although in an oblique and roundabout way, the Declaration is grounded upon, and logically presupposes, the idea The 1978 Agreements were rightly termed a 'misty penumbra of formulational ambiguity'.
11 Actually, they included, a host of loose clauses or expressions that lent themselves to conflicting interpretations. Thus, for instance, they provided for 'full autonomy to the inhabitants' of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to be achieved by means of the free election of a 'self-governing authority'. They also provided for the withdrawal of the 'Israeli military government and its civilian administration' (Section A(l)). However, the vague character of these expressions soon gave rise to radically differing interpretations by Israel and Egypt. Thus, for instance, 'full autonomy for the inhabitants' was interpreted by Israel as meaning 'personal autonomy', whereas for Egypt it meant 'territorial autonomy'; that is the autonomy of the West Bank, the Gaza District and East Jerusalem.
12 Plainly, the difference between these two interpretations is broad indeed. Similarly, the expression 'self-governing authority' was taken by Israel to denote an authority exercising powers and providing services 'normally associated with the administration of the services and facilities of a particular group of people', 13 While it would be fallacious to believe that the Israel-PLO Agreement is free from ambiguity -indeed, this Agreement is also marred by quite a few excessively loose formulas, and numerous loopholes and lacunae -nevertheless it does not lend itself to the conflicting interpretations to which I have just referred.
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V. Concluding Remarks -.
To appraise the prospects for the implementation of the PLO-Israel Agreement one should of course take into account various factors: the unique features and content of the Agreement; the fact that -whatever the legal purport and impact of its clauses -the application of the Agreement is ultimately contingent upon the persistence of the will of both parties to settle the matter, the looming presence of a host of 'external' elements (psychological, political, economic, military). All this makes it difficult to predict whether or not a settlement will eventually be reached in actual fact By the same token, it is difficult to forecast the way in which external self-determination will be implemented. For the time being, international lawyers must be content with emphasizing two things: firstly, that at long last, the path suggested by international norms, i.e. a peaceful process of negotiation between the parties concerned, has been taken; secondly, that as an initial measure, provision has been made for the exercise of internal self-determination by the Palestinians, as a stepping-stone to external selfdetermination. No one could underestimate the importance of these two elements. Whenever one is confronted with such complicated and intractable situations as that of Palestine, it proves exceedingly difficult to suggest an easy path to solutions that are both rapid and satisfactory to all those concerned. A good start has been made: a long overdue settlement, that for so many years was even unthinkable, may now be in the offing. Article IV Jurisdiction Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view die West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.
5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.
Article Vm Public Order and Security
In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order. 
